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A B S T R A C T
The relative return to strategies that augment inputs versus those that reduce inefficiencies remains a key
open question for education policy in low-income countries. Using a new nationally-representative panel
dataset of schools across 1297 villages in India, we show that the large public investments in education over
the past decade have led to substantial improvements in input-based measures of school quality, but only a
modest reduction in inefficiency as measured by teacher absence. In our data, 23.6% of teachers were absent
during unannounced school visits, and we estimate that the salary cost of unauthorized teacher absence is
$1.5 billion/year. We find two robust correlations in the nationally-representative panel data that corrobo-
rate findings from smaller-scale experiments. First, reductions in student-teacher ratios are correlated with
increased teacher absence. Second, increases in the frequency of school monitoring are strongly correlated
with lower teacher absence. Using these results, we show that reducing inefficiencies by increasing the fre-
quency of monitoring could be over ten times more cost effective at increasing the effective student-teacher
ratio than hiring more teachers. Thus, policies that decrease the inefficiency of public education spending
are likely to yield substantially higher marginal returns than those that augment inputs.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Determining the optimal level and composition of public educa-
tion spending is a key policy question in most low-income countries.
Many education advocates believe that low-income countries need
substantial increases in public education spending to meet enroll-
ment and learning goals (UNESCO, 2014); others argue that pub-
lic sector inefficiencies leave considerable room for improvement
within existing education budgets, and that fiscal constraints make
it imperative to improve the efficiency of public expenditure (World
Bank, 2010). However, the data to assess the relative importance of
these contentions remains sparse, in part, due to the difficulty in
detecting and measuring inefficiencies in public spending.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: kamurali@ucsd.edu (K. Muralidharan), jdas1@worldbank.org
(J. Das), aholla@worldbank.org (A. Holla), amohpal@umich.edu (A. Mohpal).
In this paper, we study one striking measure of public sector
inefficiency - teacher absences - with panel data collected 7 years
apart in India at a time of sharp increases in education spending.
A large portion of this increase was accounted for by the salary
cost of hiring teachers to reduce the student-teacher ratio in pub-
lic schools. As a policy alternative to hiring more teachers, we
show that reducing teacher absences by increasing school moni-
toring could be over ten times more cost effective at reducing the
effective student-teacher ratio (net of teacher absence). Thus, while
the default approach to improving education in low-income coun-
tries is input-augmentation, our results suggest that investing in
reducing inefficiencies may yield much greater returns.
India presents a particularly salient setting for our analysis.
It has the largest primary education system in the world, cater-
ing to over 200 million children. Further, over the past decade,
the Government of India has invested heavily in primary educa-
tion under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) or “Education for All
Campaign.” Partly financed by a special education tax, this national
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.005
0047-2727/ © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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program sought to correct historical inattention to primary educa-
tion and led to a substantial increase in annual spending on primary
education across several major categories of inputs including school
infrastructure, teacher quality, student-teacher ratios, and school
feeding programs.1
However, the public education system in India also faces substan-
tial governance challenges that may limit the extent to which this
additional spending translates into improved education outcomes.
Our indicator of systemic inefficiency - teacher absence - presents
a particularly striking indicator of weak governance. A nationally-
representative study of over 3000 public primary schools across 19
major Indian states found that over 25% of teachers were absent
from work on a typical working day in 2003 (Kremer et al., 2005).
Although administrative data from the government’s official records
suggest that SSA has led to an improvement in various input-based
measures of school quality, there is little evidence on whether these
investments have translated into improvements in education sys-
tem performance, both with respect to intermediate metrics such as
teacher absence and final outcomes such as test scores.2
Our study of this nationwide campaign to improve school qual-
ity in India uses a new nationally-representative panel dataset of
education inputs and outcomes that we collected in 2010. We con-
structed this dataset by revisiting a randomly-sampled subset of
the villages originally surveyed in 2003 (see Kremer et al. (2005))
and collecting detailed data on school facilities, teachers, commu-
nity participation, monitoring visits by officials, and teacher absence
rates. Thus, in addition to reporting updated estimates of teacher
absence, and independently-measured summary statistics on input-
based measures of school quality, we are able to correlate changes
in input-based measures of school quality with changes in teacher
absence. The panel data help mitigate concerns arising from fixed
unobserved heterogeneity at the village-level, and let us study how
the sharp increases in public education spending over the last decade
have affected school quality.
We find significant improvements in almost all input-based mea-
sures of school quality between 2003 and 2010. The fraction of
schools with toilets and electricity more than doubled, and the
fraction serving mid-day meals nearly quadrupled. There were sig-
nificant increases in the fraction of schools with drinking water,
libraries, and a paved road nearby. The fraction of teachers with col-
lege degrees increased by 41%, and student-teacher ratios (STR) fell
by 16%. The fraction of teachers not paid on time fell from 51 to 22%,
and the fraction of teachers reporting the existence of teacher recog-
nition programs increased from 50 to 81%. Finally, the frequency
of school inspections and parent-teacher association (PTA) meetings
increased significantly.
However, reductions in teacher absence rates were more mod-
est. The all-India weighted average teacher absence in rural areas
fell from 26.3 to 23.6%. 3 While increased teacher hiring brought
the STR down from 47 to below 40, the effective STR (ESTR), after
accounting for teacher absences was still over 50 (having reduced
from 64 in 2003 to 52 in 2010). The variation in teacher absence
across states remains high. At one end, several top performing states
have teacher absence rates below 15%, while at the other end, the
poorest performing state, Jharkhand, has a teacher absence rate of
46%.
1 In the year 2004–2005, India’s education budget was Rs.1528 billion ($25 billion)
and it more than doubled to Rs.3783 billion ($60 billion) in 2009–2010 (Pratham,
2010).
2 Official records were obtained from the “District Information System for
Education” data (commonly known as the DISE data).
3 The all-India weighted average teacher absence estimated in 2003 was 25.2%; the
corresponding figure for the rural sample was 26.3%. The panel survey only covered
the rural sample.
Our panel-data analysis, where we correlate changes in village-
level teacher absence with changes in teacher and school char-
acteristics, and administrative and community-level monitoring,
yields two robust correlations. First, reductions in the school-level
student-teacher ratio (STR) are correlated with an increase in teacher
absence, suggesting that the potential benefits from investing in
more teachers and lower STR may be partly offset by an increase
in teacher absence. Second, better top-down administrative moni-
toring is strongly correlated with lower teacher absence. Absence
rates were 6.5 percentage points lower in villages with regular pub-
lic school inspections relative to those without, which is a 25%
reduction in overall absence and a 40% decline in unauthorized
absence.4
Oneway to estimate the cost of teacher absence is to calculate the
salary cost paid by the government to teachers for days of work that
they did not attend.We estimate this fiscal cost to be over $1.5 billion
per year, which is around 60% of the entire revenue collected from
the special education tax used to fund SSA in 2010.5 Teacher salaries
typically account for over 80% of non-capital education spending
(Dongre et al., 2014), and the most expensive component of the
recently passed Right to Education (RtE) Act in India is a commit-
ment to reduce STR from 40:1 to 30:1, by hiring more teachers at
an additional cost of $5 billion/year. Using the most conservative
panel-data estimates of the correlations between increasedmonitor-
ing and reduced teacher absence, we estimate that improving school
governance (by hiringmore supervisory staff) could be over ten times
more cost effective at increasing effective student-teacher ratio (net
of teacher absence) than hiring more teachers. These calculations
suggest that the marginal returns to investing in an inefficiency-
reduction strategy (through better monitoring and governance of
the education system) are likely to be much higher than a typical
input-augmentation strategy.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on pub-
lic economics in low-income countries. First, teacher absence is now
widely used as a governance indicator in education in low- and
middle-income countries.6 We update estimates of teacher absence
in rural India from 2003 and show that despite substantial increases
in education spending over the last decade, improvements on this
key measure of governance have been more modest. While cor-
ruption in education spending has been shown to hurt learning
outcomes (Ferraz et al., 2012), our results highlight the importance of
also focusing on governance issues that lead to significant amounts of
‘passive’ waste and inefficiency on an ongoing annual basis, but may
not obtain as much media attention as one-off corruption scandals
(Bandiera et al., 2009; World Bank, 2010).
Second, the fact that decreases in STRs are correlated with
increased teacher absence underscores the importance of distin-
guishing between average and marginal rates of corruption and
waste in public spending. Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013) propose
4 These point estimates are significant and similar in both individual and multiple
regressions, and in specifications with no fixed effects, with state fixed effects, and
with district fixed effects. However, even with the use of panel data, we cannot rule
out the possibility of time-varying omitted variables at the village-level that are cor-
related with village-level changes in inspections or STR. To assess the likely bias due
to unobserved heterogeneity, we show using the technique developed by Altonji et al.
(2005) that the ratio of unobservable to observable correlates of changes in teacher
absence would have to be over 10 for our results to be completely explained by omit-
ted variables. We argue that this is unlikely given our rich data on observable changes
in school-quality (see Section 4.2.2).
5 See http://indiabudget.nic.in/budget2012-2013/ub2012-13/rec/tr.pdf.
6 The World Bank’s World Development Report 2004 provided estimates of provider
absence in both health and education for a sample of low-income countries
(Chaudhury et al., 2006; World Bank, 2003). These numbers have been widely cited
in policy discussions, and reduction in provider absence rates is often included as an
objective in aid agreements between donors and aid recipients.
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this terminology in the context of wages paid in a public-works
program in India and find that marginal rates of leakage are much
higher than average rates. We find the same result in the con-
text of teachers and show that the effective absence rate of the
marginal teacher hired is considerably higher than the average
absence (because of the increased absence among existing teachers).
This result, from a large all-India sample, mirrors smaller-sample
experimental findings in multiple settings. Duflo et al. (2015), and
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2013) present experimental evi-
dence (from Kenya and India) showing that provision of an extra
teacher to schools led to an increase in the absence rate of exist-
ing teachers in both settings. In other words, additional spending on
school inputs (of which teacher salaries are the largest component)
was correlated with increased inefficiency of spending.
Third, improvements in top-down administrative monitoring
(inspections) are more strongly correlated with reduced teacher
absence than improvements in bottom-up community monitoring
(PTA meetings), consistent with experimental evidence on the rela-
tive effectiveness of administrative and community audits on reduc-
ing corruption in road construction in Indonesia (Olken, 2007). More
broadly, a growing body of experimental evidence points to the
effectiveness of audits and monitoring (accompanied by rewards or
sanctions) in improving the performance of public-sector workers
and service providers (including Olken (2007) in Indonesia; Duflo
et al. (2012) in India; and Zamboni and Litschig (2016) in Brazil).
Our panel-data estimates using data from an “as is” nationwide
increase in monitoring of schools provide complementary evidence
to smaller-scale experiments and suggest that investing in better
governance and monitoring of service providers may be an impor-
tant component of improving state capacity for service delivery in
low-income countries (Besley and Persson, 2009;Muralidharan et al.,
2016).
Finally, recent research has pointed to ‘misallocation’ of capi-
tal and labor in low-income countries as an important contributor
to lower total factor productivity (TFP) in these settings (Hsieh
and Klenow, 2009), and has also documented that a plausible rea-
son for this misallocation is that ‘management quality’ is poorer
in low-income countries, and that public-sector firms are managed
especially poorly (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). Our results pro-
vide a striking example of weak management and misallocation in
publicly-produced primary education in India (a sector that accounts
for over 3% of GDP in spending). In particular, our estimates suggest
that reallocating a portion of the $5 billion/year increase in educa-
tion spending budgeted for hiring more teachers towards measures
focused on reducing teacher absence (for instance, by hiring more
supervisory staff) may be a much more cost effective way of increas-
ing effective teacher-student contact time. Thus, misallocation is
likely to be a first-order issue in this setting, and reallocating educa-
tion spending towards better governance may substantially increase
TFP in publicly-produced education.7
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 dis-
cusses our empirical methods and analytical framework. Section 3
reports summary statistics on school inputs and teacher absence.
Section 4 presents the cross-sectional and panel regression results.
Section 5 discusses the fiscal costs of weak governance and compares
the returns to investing in better monitoring with that from hiring
more teachers. Section 6 discusses policy implications, and Section 7
concludes.
7 Such misallocation in education spending is also seen in other low-income coun-
tries. An even more striking example is provided by de Ree et al. (2015) who
experimentally study the intensive-margin impacts of an Indonesian policy reform
that doubled teacher pay across the board (at a similar cost of $5 billion/year) and find
that the teacher pay increase had no impact on student learning.
2. Data and analytic framework
The nationally-representative sample used for the 2003 surveys,
which our current study uses as a base, covered both urban and rural
areas across the 19 most populous states of India, except Delhi. This
represented over 95% of the country’s population. The 2010 sam-
ple covered only rural India. The sampling strategy in 2010 aimed
to maintain representativeness of the current landscape of schools
in rural India, and to maximize the size of the panel. We met these
twin objectives by retaining the villages in the original sample to the
extent possible, while re-sampling schools from the full universe of
schools in these villages in 2010, and conducting the panel analysis
at the village level.8
Enumerators first conducted school censuses in each village,
from which we sampled up to three schools per village for the
absence surveys. During fieldwork, enumerators made three sepa-
rate visits to each sampled school over a period of 10 months from
January–October 2010.9 Data on school infrastructure and accessibil-
ity, finances, and teacher demographics were collected once for each
school (typically during the first visit, but completed in later visits if
necessary), while data on time-varying metrics such as teacher and
student attendance and dates of the most recent inspections and PTA
meetings were collected in each of the three visits. We also assessed
student learning with a test administered to a representative sam-
ple of fourth grade students in sampled schools. See Appendix A and
Tables A1 – A3 for further details on sampling and construction of
the village-level panel data set.
Teacher absence was measured by direct physical verification of
teacher presence within the first fifteen minutes of a survey visit.
Data collected during the school census were used to pre-populate
teacher rosters for the sampled schools, so that enumerators could
look for teachers and record their attendance and activity imme-
diately after their arrival at the school.10 Once teacher attendance
was recorded, all other data were collected using interviews of head
teachers and individual teachers.11
We record teachers as absent on a given visit if they were not
found anywhere in the school in the first fifteen minutes after enu-
merators reached a school. We consider all the teachers in the school
to be absent if the school was closed during regular working hours on
a school day, and respondents near the school did not know why the
school was closed or mentioned that the school was closed because
no teacher had arrived or they had all left early.12 To be conservative
in our measure of absence, we exclude all school closures due to bad
weather, school construction/repairs, school functions and alterna-
tive uses of school premises (for instance, elections). We also exclude
8 This is also why the 2010 wave did not include urban areas. Since school-level
identifiers from the 2003 survey were not preserved (for confidentiality reasons), the
panel needed to be constructed at the town/village level. However, since the fraction
of urban schools covered in 2003 (relative to the total number of schools in the sam-
pled towns) was very small, it was not possible to construct a credible panel-data
estimate of school quality in towns. In rural areas, this was not a concern because we
typically covered all the public schools in a village (in 84.2% of the cases) and had a
mean coverage rate of 82.7% of public schools in the sampled villages.
9 While the school year is not identical across states, it typically runs from mid-
June to mid-April. The three visits therefore spanned two academic years, with the
first visit being made during January–March 2010, the second visit being made during
June–August, and the third visit during August–October 2010.
10 This was important given the widespread possession of cell phones among teach-
ers, which would allow them to call up absent colleagues on seeing external visitors
in the school measuring teacher absence.
11 Not all interviews could be completed. Most non-responses were at the teacher as
opposed to the school level (since absent teachers could not be interviewed, whereas
school data could be obtained from either the head teacher or any other senior
teacher). These non-responses are unlikely to affect the analysis in this paper because
the panel-data analysis will focus on aggregated data at the village level as opposed to
the individual data at the teacher level.
12 Field teams obtained lists of state and national school holidays in advance of
creating the field plans and ensured that no visits were conducted on these days.
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all part-time teachers, teachers who were transferred or reassigned
elsewhere, or teachers reportedly on a different shift.
We construct a school infrastructure index by adding binary indi-
cators for the presence of drinking water, toilets, electricity, and a
library. We construct a remoteness index by taking the average of
nine normalized indicators of distance to various amenities including
a paved road, bus station, train station, public health facility, private
health clinic, university, bank, post-office and Ministry of Education
office. A lower score on the remoteness index represents a better
connected school. During each survey visit, enumerators referred to
written school records to note the date of the most recent school
inspection, and the date of the most recent parent-teacher associ-
ation (PTA) meeting. Average parental education of children in a
school is computed from the basic demographic data collected for the
sample of fourth-grade students chosen for assessments of learning
outcomes.
For most of the analysis in this paper, we use the village as our
unit of analysis and examine mean village-level indicators of both
inputs and outcomes because a large number of new schools had
been constructed between 2003 and 2010, including in villages that
already had schools. This school construction resulted from a policy
designed to improve school access by ensuring that every habitation
with over 30 school-age children had a school within a distance of
one kilometer. Thus, to ensure that our sample was representative in
2010, and at the same time amenable to panel data analysis relative
to 2003, we constructed the panel at the village level, with a new rep-
resentative sample of schools drawn in the sampled villages.13 All the
results reported in this paper are population weighted and are thus
representative of the relevant geographic unit (i.e., state or all-India).
3. Summary statistics
3.1. Changes in inputs
The data show considerable improvements in school inputs
between 2003 and 2010 along three broad categories - teacher qual-
ifications and working conditions, school facilities, and monitoring
(Table 1 - Panels A–C). The fraction of teachers with a college degree
increased from 41 to 58%, the fraction reporting that they were get-
ting paid regularly rose from 49 to 78%, and the fraction reporting
the existence of teacher recognition schemes rose from 50 to 81%.
The fraction of teachers who report a formal teaching credential fell
from 77 to 68%, largely due to a significant increase in the hiring
of contract teachers (who are not required to have teaching creden-
tials) in several large states. In our data, the fraction of teachers on a
temporary contract or ‘contract teachers’ increased from 6 to 30%.
School facilities and infrastructure improved on almost every
measure. The fraction of schools with toilets and electricity more
than doubled (from 40% to 84% for toilets and 22% to 45% for
electricity); the fraction of schools with functioning mid-day meal
programs nearly quadrupled (from 22% to 79%); the fraction of
schools with a library increased by over 35 %(from 51% to 69%),
and almost all schools now have access to drinking water (96%).
Initiatives outside the education ministry to increase road construc-
tion have also led to increased proximity of schools to paved roads
increasing the accessibility of schools for teachers who choose to
live farther away. Relative to the distribution observed in 2003, a
13 Even in the absence of school construction, the survey firm did not retain school
and teacher level identifiers from the 2003 survey (complying with data protec-
tion norms), which would have made it difficult to construct a school-level panel
(especially for villages with multiple schools).
Table 1
Changes in key variables between 2003 and 2010, village-level data.
(1) (2) (3)
Summary statistics Difference
Year
2003
Year
2010
(Ho: No diff)
A. Teacher variables
Have bachelors degree 0.41 0.58 0.174***
Have teacher training 0.77 0.68 −0.085***
Are contract teachers 0.06 0.30 0.233***
Are paid regularly 0.49 0.78 0.285***
Recognition scheme exists 0.50 0.81 0.309***
B. School variables
Student-teacher ratio (STR) 47.19 39.80 −7.388***
Mid-day meals 0.22 0.79 0.576***
Infrastructure index (0–4) 2.14 3.35 1.205***
Has drinking water 0.80 0.96 0.160***
Has toilets 0.40 0.84 0.440***
Has electricity 0.22 0.45 0.236***
Has library 0.51 0.69 0.183***
C. Monitoring and community variables
Road is within 1 km 0.69 0.78 0.092***
Probability of inspection in last 3 months 0.38 0.56 0.176***
Probability of inspection in last 2 months 0.31 0.50 0.189***
Probability of inspection in last 1 month 0.22 0.38 0.155***
Probability of PTA meeting in last 3 months 0.30 0.45 0.153***
Mean parental education (1–7 scale) 2.03 2.43 0.394***
State per-capita GDP (thousands of Rs.) 14.74 30.21 15.473***
D. Absence variables
Teacher absence rate (%) 26.29 23.64 −2.64***
Effective student-teacher ratio (ESTR) 64.02 52.13 −11.89†
Source:Authors’ calculations; Central Statistical Organization, India. Notes: Summary
statistics (except Student-teacher ratio) are weighted by rural population of Socio-
Cultural Regions (SCRs) in Census 2001. Student-teacher ratio is weighted by SCR
school enrolment. Data for number of days since inspection and truncated at 99th per-
centile. State per-capita GDP figures are in 2004–2005 prices. Absence figures for 2003
differ slightly from the figures in the Kremer et al. (2005) paper. This is because the
urban schools are removed from the sample.
† We do not conduct inference on the changes in “Effective Student-Teacher Ratio”
because the data on total number of teachers are obtained from administrative (DISE)
data. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
summary index of school infrastructure improved by 0.9 standard
deviations.14
We also find improvements in both ‘top-down’ administrative
and ‘bottom-up’ community monitoring of schools over this period.
The fraction of schools inspected in the three months prior to a
survey visit increased from 38% to 56%. The extent of community
oversight of schools, measured by the frequency of PTA meetings
also increased: The probability that a PTA meeting took place during
the three months prior to a survey visit increased from 30% to 45%.
Overall, Table 1 (Panel A–C) confirms that the Government of India’s
increased focus on primary education in the past decade did lead to
significant improvements in input-based measures of school quality,
as well as administrative and community monitoring.
3.2. Changes in teacher absence
We now turn to changes in teacher absence. Table 1 (Panel
D) shows that the population-weighted national average teacher
absence rate for rural India fell from 26.3 percent% to 23.6%, a reduc-
tion of 10%. Since students receive reduced teacher attention when
teachers are absent, we divide the STR by “1 - teacher absence rate”
14 We construct an index of school infrastructure by adding indicators for the exis-
tence of four items: drinking water, toilets, electricity, and a library. Table 1 provides
summary statistics for each indicator and the overall index.
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to obtain the effective student teacher ratio (ESTR). Although the
all-India STR had been reduced to below 40 in this period, the effec-
tive STR after accounting for teacher absence was still over 52. We
present state-level data on teacher absence rates and ESTR for 2003
and 2010 in Table A4.15
Chaudhury et al. (2006) find a strong negative correlation
between GDP/capita and teacher absence rates (both across
countries and within Indian states). Hence, one way to interpret the
magnitude of these changes is to compare them with the expected
reduction in teacher absence that may be attributed simply to the
economic growth that has taken place in this period. Using a growth
accounting (as opposed to causal) framework, we can decompose the
change in teacher absence into a component explained by changes
in GDP/capita (as a proxy for ‘inputs’) and one explained by a change
in governance (a proxy for TFP). Cross-sectional estimates from the
2003 data suggest that a 10 percent increase in GDP/capita is asso-
ciated with a 0.6 percentage point reduction in teacher absence.16
In the period between 2002 and 2010, real GDP/capita in India
had grown by 38%. Thus, growth in GDP/capita over this period
should have by itself contributed to a reduction in teacher absence
of 2.4%. Our estimate of the change in teacher absence rate is
exactly in this range, and suggests that the reduction of teacher
absence we document is consistent with a proportional increase
in ‘inputs’ into education, but a limited improvement in TFP in
this period. We discuss the policy implications of this result in the
conclusion.
3.3. Stated reasons for absence, teaching activity, and official records
In cases where a teacher was not found in the school, enumer-
ators asked the head teacher (or senior-most teacher present) for
the reason for absence. These stated reasons are summarized in
Table 2 (Panel A). Two categories of clearly unauthorized absence
(school closure during working hours and no valid reason for
absence) account for just under half the cases of teacher absence
(48%), which provides a lower bound on the extent of unautho-
rized absences of 11.3 percentage points. The two other categories of
stated absence (authorized leave and official duties) that account for
52% of the observed absence are potentially legitimate but cannot be
verified.
While head teachers may overstate the extent of official duties
to shield absent colleagues, they should have no reason to under-
state it. We can, therefore, reasonably treat the stated reasons
for absence as an upper bound for duty-induced absence. This
yields the important finding that one commonly cited reason for
teacher absence - namely, that teachers are often asked to perform
non-teaching duties such as conducting censuses and monitoring
elections - is a very small contributor to the high rate of observed
teacher absence. Table 2 - Panel A shows that official non-teaching
duties account for less than 1% of observations and under 4% of
15 We find large variation in teacher absence rates across states ranging from 12.9%
in Tamilnadu to 45.8% in Jharkhand. Teacher absence rates declined in 14 out of 19
states with significant reductions in 12 states, and five states having teacher absence
rates below 15%. However, the ESTR in 2010 in three of India’s most educationally
backward states (Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh) was as high as 97, 79, and 69.
Thus, teacher absence can sharply increase the effective STR experienced by students
relative to the STR calculated using state-level figures on enrollment and number of
teachers.
16 The cross-sectional relationship is estimated by regressing village-level teacher
absence on the log of district-level per-capita consumption (from the National Sam-
ple Survey) in the 2003 survey. Estimates without state fixed effects are larger (and
equal −1.17) whereas estimates with state fixed effects are smaller but still significant
(and equal to −0.63). Our default estimate is based on using state-fixed effects since
cross-state variation in per-capita income is much more likely to be correlated with
unmeasured governance quality. Tables are available on request.
Table 2
Teacher activity and reasons for absence (%).
(1) (2)
Year 2003 Year 2010
A. Physical verification: Absent 26.29 23.64
School closed 6.08 6.60
Official teaching related duties
(trainings, meetings, etc.)
5.93 5.21
Official non-teaching duties (education,
health campaigns, etc.)
0.95 0.93
Official other duties (panchayat
meetings, political meetings, etc.)
0.31 0.29
Authorized leave 7.62 5.91
No reason 5.40 4.70
B. Physical verification: Present 73.71 76.36
In classroom, actively teaching 42.93 53.08
In classroom, passively teaching 5.56 4.16
In classroom, not teaching 15.88 8.96
Found outside classroom 9.35 10.15
C. Logbook records
Present today 80.93 84.06
Present last working day 89.76
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: All figures are weighted by SCR’s rural popu-
lation. In 0.37% of cases, respondents said that a log-book was not maintained in
the school, 0.23% refused to show log-book. In the year 2003, logbook records for
previous working day were not collected. The full list of activities under for not teach-
ing are - doing administrative/paper work, talking to/accompanying the surveyor,
chatting/talking (with teachers, others), reading magazines/newspapers, sleeping,
watching TV/listening to radio, doing other personal work, idle. Reasons for school
closed are - opening hours but no one has arrived yet, opening hours but everyone left,
and no reason.
the cases of teacher absence (these results are unchanged from
2003).
In cases where the teacher was present, enumerators recorded
the activity that the teacher was engaged in at the point of obser-
vation: 53% of teachers on the payroll were found to be actively
teaching, and another 4% were coded as passively teaching (defined
as minding the class while students do their own work). Just
over 19% of teachers were in school but were either not in the
classroom or not engaged in any teaching activity while in the
classroom (Table 2 - Panel B). Thus a total of 42% of teachers on
the payroll were either absent or not teaching at the time of direct
observations.17
Finally, enumerators also recorded whether a teacher had been
marked as present in the log-books on the day of the visit and also
on the previous day, and we see in Table 2 - Panel C that going
by these records would suggest a much lower teacher absence rate
of 16% using the same day’s records, or as low as 10.2% using the
previous day’s records (this was not collected in 2003).18 These
data highlight the importance of measuring teacher absence by
direct physical verification as opposed to official records on log
books.
17 This is almost surely a lower-bound estimate because in many cases it is
easy for a teacher who may not have been teaching to pick up a book and look
like he or she is actively teaching when it is known that someone is visiting
the school (see Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2010) for evidence documenting
this).
18 Note that teachers sign the log-books when they come in and there is typically
no roll call where a head teacher records them as absent if they are not in school at
a given time. Thus, the log-books record ‘presence’ rather than ‘absence’. This may
explain the higher recorded presence on the previous day than on the day of the visit,
since teachers arriving late will sign themselves as present though they may not have
arrived during the time the enumerators reached school. It is also not uncommon for
teachers to retrospectively sign log-books recording themselves as ‘present’ on days
that they were absent.
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4. Cross-section and panel regression results
4.1. Correlates of teacher absence in 2010
Table 3 presents village-level cross-sectional regressions between
indicators of school quality and teacher absence in 2010. Column 1
shows the mean level of each covariate in the sample, columns 2–
4 present the coefficients on each indicator in individual regressions
with the dependent variable being teacher absence, while columns
5–7 do so inmultiple regressions that include all the variables shown
in Table 1 as regressors.
We first show the regressions with no fixed effects, then with
state fixed effects, and finally with district fixed effects. The com-
parison of results with and without state fixed effects is important
for interpretation. Many indicators of school quality vary consider-
ably across states in a manner that is likely to be correlated with
other measures of governance and development as well as the his-
tory of education investments in these states. On a similar note,
while primary education policy is typically made at the state level,
there is often important variation across districts within a state
based on historical as well as geographical factors (Banerjee and
Iyer, 2005; Iyer, 2010). Thus, specifications with district fixed effects
that are identified using only within-district variation are least likely
to be confounded by omitted variables correlated with historical or
geographical factors. However, there may still be important fixed
omitted variables across villages (such as the level of interest in
education in the community) that are correlated with both mea-
sured quality of schools and teachers as well as teacher absence.
We therefore present the cross-sectional regressions in Table 3 for
completeness and focus our discussion on the village-level panel
regressions presented in Table 4. Overall, there are few robust cor-
relations across all specifications except that schools that have been
inspected recently have lower rates of absence. One important result
in the correlations is that there appears to be no significant relation-
ship between teacher salary and the probability of teacher absence.
Since salary data were not collected in the 2003 survey, this variable
is not included in the panel analysis below.
4.2. Correlates of changes in teacher absence between 2003 and 2010
The main identification challenge in the cross-sectional regres-
sions presented in Table 3 (and in Kremer et al. (2005)) is that we
cannot rule out the possibility that the results are confounded with
village-level omitted variables. The use of panel data helps miti-
gate these concerns since our correlations are now identified using
changes in village-level measures of school inputs. Table 4 (columns
4–6) presents results from the following regression:
DAbsi = b0 + b1 •DTi + b2 •DSi + b3 •DMi + bZi • Zi + 4i (1)
where DAbsi is the change in the mean teacher absence rate in gov-
ernment schools in village i between 2003 and 2010, DTi is the
change in village-levelmeans ofmeasures of teacher attributes,DSi is
the change in village-level means of measures of school facilities, and
DMi is the change in village-level means of measures of school mon-
itoring and supervision. Zi represents different levels of fixed effects
(state or district) and 4i is the error term. Since changes in the mea-
sures of school quality included above may be correlated, we report
both individual regressions with only covariate at a time (columns
1–3) as well as multiple regressions that include all of these covari-
ates (columns 4–6).
Since Eq.(1) differences away fixed unobserved heterogeneity at
the village level (and therefore at the state and district level as well),
the inclusion of state and district fixed effects in the specification
controls for average state and district specific changes over time in
both the left-hand and right-hand side variables. Thus our panel
results with state and district fixed effects are least likely to be con-
founded with time-invariant and time-variant omitted variables.19
However, it is also worth noting that such a specification biases us
against detecting small effects. First, first-differencing leaves us with
less variation in the explanatory variables, which will increase stan-
dard errors. Second, to the extent there is measurement error in
the explanatory variables, first differencing would also increase the
attenuation bias. This is why we focus our discussion and interpre-
tation of the results on the ones that are robustly significant and do
not treat lack of evidence of significant effects as strong evidence in
favor of null effects.
Nevertheless, the results in Table 4 suggest that several plausible
narratives for the reasons for teacher absence seen in the cross-
sectional data reported in Kremer et al. (2005) are not supported
in the panel data regressions. In particular, unlike in Kremer et al.
(2005), we find no correlation between changes in school infras-
tructure or proximity to a paved road and teacher absence. We also
find no correlation between changes in teacher professional quali-
fications or professional conditions (such as regularity of pay) and
changes in teacher absence.20
We find two robust relationships in the panel regressions, where
we define ‘robust’ as correlations that are significant in both individ-
ual and multiple regressions; significant in all three main specifica-
tions (no fixed effects, state fixed effects, and district fixed effects)
and consistent across all specifications (we cannot reject that the
estimates are the same across specifications). We discuss these two
results below.
4.2.1. Reductions in STR are correlated with increased teacher absence
First, villages that saw a reduction in student-teacher ratio (STR)
have significantly higher rates of teacher absence. A 10% reduction
in STR is correlated with a 0.5% increase in average teacher absence,
and these estimates remain stable whenwe include state and district
fixed effects and are unchangedwhenwe include a full set of controls
(also measured in changes).
Changes in STR reflect changes in enrollment as well as in the
number of teachers, and a higher STR may affect teacher absence
through both enrollment and number of teachers. First, having more
students enrolled may increase the cost to teachers of being absent
since there are more students (and parents) who may complain. Sec-
ond, the most common outcome for students when their teacher is
absent is that they are combined with other classes/grades whose
teachers are present.21 Thus, havingmore teachers in the school may
make it easier for teachers to be absent (since other teachers can
handle their class).22
These correlations should not be interpreted as causal (for
instance, student enrolment may decline in response to increased
teacher absence), but they are consistent with a causal relationship
19 Another way of interpreting the specifications is that the one with no fixed effects
is using all the variation in the nationwide changes over time in left and right-hand
side variables, and the ones with state and district fixed effects are estimated using
within-state and within-district variation in the changes respectively.
20 However, note that the introduction of teacher recognition schemes appears to
be correlated with lower teacher absence; with a significant negative correlation in
four of six specifications (Columns 1–4) and unchanged point estimates (though not
significant) in the other two (Columns 5–6).
21 Doing so does not deviate from the norm in the context of rural Indian
government-run primary schools because our data show that close to 80% of schools
practice multi-grade teaching (where one teacher simultaneously teaches students
across multiple grades at the same time in the same classroom) in any case.
22 In further analysis, we find support for both these channels. Decomposing changes
in STR into changes in enrollment and changes in number of teachers, we find that
the former are positively correlated with changes in teacher absence and the latter
are negatively correlated (results available on request). However, we focus our discus-
sion on the STR because the policy goals for teacher hiring are stated in terms of STR,
and because changes in the number of teachers are highly correlated with changes in
enrollment.
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Table 3
Cross-section OLS regressions results, village level, 2010 data (dependent variable: teacher absence rate (%)).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Summary statistics Individual regressions Multiple regressions
Year 2010 No fixed
effects
w/ State
fixed effects
w/ District
fixed effects
No fixed
effects
w/ State
fixed effects
w/ District
fixed effects
Teacher variables
Have bachelors degree 0.58 −1.03 −6.20*** −7.51*** −1.96 −5.78** −6.84***
(0.32) (1.94) (2.39) (2.57) (1.76) (2.45) (2.59)
Have teacher training 0.68 −11.95*** −3.48 −2.92 −2.39 −2.43 −2.09
(0.31) (2.38) (2.39) (2.73) (2.81) (2.69) (2.87)
Are contract teachers 0.30 10.97*** 0.46 −1.12 −2.25 −0.27 −2.32
(0.30) (2.37) (2.48) (2.97) (2.83) (2.71) (3.21)
Are paid regularly 0.78 −7.72*** −1.51 −1.24 −2.53 −1.10 −0.60
(0.39) (1.95) (1.92) (2.20) (2.00) (1.95) (2.17)
Recognition scheme exists 0.81 −6.53*** −1.43 −1.72 −2.25 −0.19 −0.94
(0.37) (2.12) (1.86) (2.07) (2.08) (1.81) (2.01)
Log of salary 9.25 −3.70*** −0.58 −0.30 0.43 −0.18 −0.15
(0.62) (1.08) (0.88) (0.96) (1.01) (0.94) (0.99)
School variables
Log student-teacher ratio 3.50 1.88 −2.31** −4.07*** −2.42** −1.65* −3.29***
(0.59) (1.26) (1.15) (1.40) (1.10) (0.99) (1.24)
Mid-day meals 0.79 0.77 0.57 2.62 0.49 0.47 2.01
(0.38) (1.74) (1.80) (2.07) (1.70) (1.77) (2.03)
Infrastructure index (0–4) 3.35 −3.44*** −0.23 −0.31 −0.89 0.07 0.07
(1.30) (0.56) (0.70) (0.80) (0.68) (0.69) (0.77)
Remoteness index (normalized) 0.04 0.26 0.58 0.76 0.19 0.17 0.14
(0.95) (0.68) (0.59) (0.64) (0.64) (0.61) (0.65)
Monitoring and community variables
Probability of inspection in last 3 months 0.56 -10.47*** −7.87*** −7.63*** −6.64*** −6.32*** −6.20***
(0.29) (2.07) (2.08) (2.39) (1.90) (2.04) (2.37)
Probability of PTA meeting in last 3 months 0.45 −6.72*** −2.80** -3.22** −2.59* −1.77 −2.13
(0.48) (1.51) (1.17) (1.32) (1.33) (1.13) (1.32)
Mean parental education (1–7 scale) 2.43 −3.16*** 0.37 −0.46 −0.90 0.64 −0.82
(0.74) (1.00) (0.97) (1.08) (1.00) (0.95) (1.07)
Log state per-capita GDP 3.29 −11.01*** −9.27***
(0.49) (1.51) (2.50)
Regression statistics
Constant 74.58***
(11.76)
R-squared 0.139 0.231 0.394
Adjusted R-squared 0.126 0.211 0.273
F-statistic (Inspected = PTA met) 3.186* 3.450* 2.024
Number of villages 1,555 1,555 1,555
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: In summary statistics, standard deviations are in parentheses; in bivariate and multiple regressions, robust standard errors clustered at the
district-level are in parentheses. In individual regressions (Columns 2–4), each cell is a separate regression of the row variables with the dependent variable being the change in
teacher absence rate in percentage points at the village-level. In multiple regressions (Columns 5–7), each column is a single regression on all row variables. Infrastructure index
variable uses availability of four items (drinking water, toilets, electricity, and library) with higher values representing better infrastructure; similarly remoteness index uses
distances to nine sets of facilities, with higher values representing more remote villages. Summary statistics and regressions are weighted by SCR’s population. *** Significant at
1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
between increased teacher hiring and increased absence of exist-
ing teachers that has been established experimentally in India
(Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2013) and other low-income
countries such as Kenya (Duflo et al., 2015). Our results provide
complementary evidence and greater external validity to these
experimental results, and suggest that the benefits of additional
teacher hiring to reduce STR may be attenuated by increased teacher
absence (in contexts with weak governance of education systems).
4.2.2. Increasing monitoring is correlated with reduced teacher absence
The second robust result in the panel data estimates is the
strong negative correlation between improved school monitoring
and teacher absence. In each of the three visits to a school, enu-
merators recorded the date of the most recent inspection, and we
average across the three visits across all the sampled schools in the
village to construct the variable “Probability of being inspected in
last 3 months”, which ranges from zero (none of the schools in the
village were inspected in the prior three months in any of the three
visits) to one (all the schools in the villagewere inspected in the prior
three months in all of the three visits). We find that villages where
the probability of inspection in the past threemonths increased from
zero to one had a reduction in average teacher absence of between
6.4 and 8.2 percentage points (a 27–35 percent reduction in teacher
absence).23 While these results are based on correlations, we present
several pieces of evidence consistent with a causal effect of increased
school inspections on reduced teacher absence.
First, we look at the categories of stated reasons for absence
(official duty, authorized leave, and unauthorized absence), and find
that increases in inspection probability are correlated only with
reductions in unauthorized teacher absence, but not with reduc-
tions in teacher absence due to either official duty or authorized
leave (Table 5). Second, we examine the extent to which changes in
23 We also consider two alternative constructions: “Probability of being inspected in
last 2 months” and “Probability of being inspected in last 1 month.” Results are similar
and available upon request.
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Table 4
Panel OLS regression results, village-level (dependent variable: percentage points change in teacher absence).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual regressions Multiple regressions
No fixed
effects
w/ State
fixed effects
w/ District
fixed effects
No fixed
effects
w/ State
fixed effects
w/ District
fixed effects
Changes in teacher variables
Have bachelors degree −0.42 −1.69 −3.69 −1.68 −2.31 −4.71
(2.55) (2.52) (2.91) (2.51) (2.57) (3.04)
Have teacher training 1.10 1.12 0.52 1.08 0.79 1.53
(2.51) (2.76) (3.12) (2.81) (2.85) (3.19)
Are contract teachers −4.89 −3.39 −0.86 −5.26 −3.84 −0.83
(3.20) (3.41) (3.52) (3.37) (3.60) (4.03)
Are paid regularly −0.18 −0.83 −1.47 −0.28 −0.97 −0.56
(1.70) (1.81) (2.11) (1.67) (1.77) (2.24)
Recognition scheme exists −3.87** −3.34* −3.69** −3.06* −2.03 −3.34
(1.76) (1.75) (1.87) (1.71) (1.69) (2.23)
Changes in school variables
Log student-teacher ratio −5.33*** −4.89*** −4.48** −5.56*** −4.95*** −4.69***
(1.83) (1.68) (1.91) (1.81) (1.57) (1.78)
Mid-day meals 1.31 1.81 4.19 1.62 0.95 2.14
(1.73) (2.09) (2.59) (1.73) (2.08) (2.85)
Infrastructure index (0–4) −1.10* −0.97 −1.01 −0.97 −0.68 −0.96
(0.66) (0.69) (0.76) (0.66) (0.66) (0.78)
Remoteness index (normalized) −1.16 −0.93 −0.55 −1.25 −1.04 −0.81
(1.05) (1.06) (1.08) (1.00) (0.95) (1.13)
Changes in monitoring and community variables
Probability of inspection in last 3 months −8.23*** −7.31*** −6.60*** −7.35*** −6.56*** −6.41***
(1.94) (1.98) (1.91) (1.83) (1.83) (2.01)
Probability of PTA meeting in last 3 months −1.65 −3.18* −3.80** -1.71 −2.08 −2.96
(1.74) (1.63) (1.72) (1.67) (1.64) (2.02)
Mean parental education (1–7 scale) −1.29 −0.09 0.48 −1.13 −0.46 0.51
(1.40) (1.38) (1.44) (1.29) (1.32) (1.46)
Log state per-capita GDP −4.69 −6.18
(7.39) (7.18)
Regression statistics
Constant 3.43
(5.50)
R-squared 0.071 0.143 0.346
Adjusted R-squared 0.054 0.115 0.188
F-statistic (Inspected = PTA met) 4.419** 2.921* 1.268
Number of villages 1,297 1,297 1,297
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: In summary statistics, standard deviations are in parentheses; in bivariate and multiple regressions, robust standard errors clustered at the
district-level are in parentheses. In individual regressions (Columns 1–3), each cell is a separate regression of the row variables with the dependent variable being the change in
teacher absence rate in percentage points at the village-level. In multiple regressions (Columns 4–6), each column is a single regression on all row variables. Infrastructure index
variable uses availability of four items (drinking water, toilets, electricity, and library) with higher values representing better infrastructure; similarly remoteness index uses
distances to nine sets of facilities, with higher values representing more remote villages. Regressions are weighted by SCR’s population. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10%.
inspection frequency can be explained by other observable factors,
and find that there are no correlations between changes in inspec-
tion frequency and changes in other observable measures of school
quality that are significant across our three standard specifications
(Table A5). Third, we use the technique developed by Altonji et al.
(2005) to show that the ratio of unobservable to observable corre-
lates of changes in teacher absence would have to be over a factor of
10 for these results to be completely explained by omitted variables
(Table A6). Given the very rich data we have on observable changes
in school quality, and the fact that our estimates are unchanged even
after including state and district fixed effects, this is unlikely to be
the case.24
Finally, these results are also consistent with experimental evi-
dence from India that finds significant reduction in teacher absence
in response to improved monitoring and rewards linked to better
24 However, since we cannot completely rule out this possibility, our policy recom-
mendations use a decision-theoretic approach to expanding school monitoring that
accounts for this uncertainty (see Section 6).
teacher attendance (Duflo et al., 2012). This experimental study,
however, was carried out in a small sample of informal schools in one
district in India. Thus, our estimates using nationally-representative
panel data of rural public schools across 190 districts provide com-
plementary evidence that improved ‘top down’ administrative mon-
itoring may have a substantial impact on reducing unauthorized
teacher absence.
In contrast, there is less evidence that increases in ‘bottom
up’ monitoring by the community (measured by whether the PTA
had met in the past 3 months) are correlated with reductions in
teacher absence (Table 4). This is consistent with the experimental
results reported in Olken (2007) on the impacts of monitoring
corruption in Indonesia. These results should not be interpreted as
suggesting that bottom-up monitoring cannot be effective, since it
is also likely that they reflect differences in the effective authority
over teachers possessed by administrative superiors (high) versus
parents (low). PTAs in India typically do not have authority to
appoint or retain regular civil-service teachers, and they cannot
sanction teachers for absence or non-performance (Banerjee et
al., 2010).
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Table 5
Correlation between inspection frequency and teacher absence by reason (panel analysis: year 2003 and year 2010 data).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual regressions Multiple regressions
No fixed
effects
w/ State
fixed effects
w/ District
fixed effects
No fixed
effects
w/ State
fixed effects
w/ District
fixed effects
Panel A: Change in teacher absence due to official duty
Change in probability of inspection −1.77* −1.05 −1.45 −1.43 −1.00 −1.49
(0.92) (0.85) (0.97) (0.91) (0.83) (0.96)
Panel B: Change in teacher absence due to authorized leave
Change in probability of inspection 0.77 0.42 0.59 0.59 0.33 0.50
(0.83) (0.84) (0.91) (0.85) (0.84) (0.91)
Panel C: Change in teacher absence due to unauthorized leave
Change in probability of inspection −7.22*** −6.68*** −5.74*** −6.51*** −6.07*** −5.41***
(1.69) (1.86) (1.78) (1.66) (1.79) (1.75)
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. Regressions are weighted by SCR’s population. Multiple regressions
include full set of controls as Table 3, coefficients not shown for brevity. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Inspectors and administrative superiors, on the other hand, pos-
sess considerable authority over teachers. Their powers include the
ability to demand explanations for absence, to issue verbal or written
warnings, to make adverse entries in teachers’ performance records,
to recommend against a pay increment, to suspend a teacher, and in
extreme cases to initiate proceedings to fire a teacher (see Ministry
of Education (1964-1966) for a detailed discussion of the design
of the Indian school inspection system and the powers it provides
inspectors). While it is rare for teachers in India to actually get
fired for absence (Kremer et al., 2005), and also true that politically-
connected teachers can evade sanctions for absence (De and Dreze,
1999; Kingdon et al., 2014), the teacher service rules include several
provisions that make it possible for inspectors to significantly raise
the costs of teacher absence and thereby reduce it. A striking recent
example of how a motivated school inspector in India was able to
reduce teacher absence is provided by Anand (Feb. 19, 2016).25
In interpreting the result on school inspections, it is useful to con-
sider why there might be variation in the frequency of inspections
across villages and what this would imply for a causal interpretation.
One obvious explanation is that inspectors are more likely to visit
more accessible villages, but the data do not support this hypothe-
sis since there is no correlation between changes in the remoteness
index and changes in inspection rates (Table A5).
District-level interviews on school governance in India suggest
two important reasons for the variation in inspection frequency. The
first is staffing. Districts are broken down further into administra-
tive blocks, and schools within blocks are organized into clusters.
School supervision is typically conducted by “block education offi-
cers” and “cluster resource coordinators”. We find that a significant
fraction of these posts are often unfilled. For instance, in 19% of the
cases (where we have data) even the position of the “District Edu-
cation Officer (DEO)”, the senior-most education official in a district,
25 In addition to the possibility of formal disciplinary action against absent teach-
ers, an additional channel for the deterrence effect of increased inspections on teacher
absence may stem from the possibility that inspectors can extract side payments from
absent teachers in return for not making a formal adverse entry on their service record
(World Bank, 2003). Social norms would make it difficult to ‘extort’ such payments
from teachers who are actually present, but it would be much easier to demand a pay-
ment from an absent teacher in return for not initiating formal action. Thus, even if
the costs of initiating formal disciplinary action are high (and the incidence of such
action is low), there may be other informal channels through which more frequent
inspections serve as a disincentive for teacher absence. We also test to see if increased
inspections are only correlated with reduced absence rates for contract teachers (who
have less job security), and find that this is not the case. Increased inspections are sig-
nificantly correlatedwith reductions in absence for both regular and contract teachers,
and there is no significant difference between the two.
was vacant (Centre for Policy Research, 2012).26 Further, there is
high turnover in the education administration (the average DEO had
a tenure in office of just one year) creating periods when the posi-
tions are vacant during transitions. The lack of supervisory staff at the
block-level is even more acute, as 32% of these positions were esti-
mated to be vacant in 2010 (the year of our survey) even by an official
government report (13th JRM Monitoring Report, 2011). Our inter-
views suggest that these staffing gaps at the block and cluster level
are the most important source of variation in inspection frequency
within districts, since blocks and clusters without supervisory staff
are much less likely to get inspected.
The second source of variation in inspections is the diligence of
the concerned supervisory officer. Even if all the positions of super-
visory staff were filled, there would be variation in the zealousness
with which these officers visited villages/schools, which might lead
to some areas being inspected more often than others based on
whether they were in the coverage area of a more diligent officer
or not. However, since supervisors are typically assigned a coverage
area of clusters or blocks that comprise many villages, variation in
monitoring frequency that is driven by supervisor-level unobserv-
able characteristics is unlikely to be correlated with other village-
level characteristics that are also correlated with absence. Of course,
this source of variation has implications for thinking about the likely
effectiveness of hiring new supervisory staff (some of whom may be
less diligent). We discuss these in Section 5.3.
4.3. Teacher absence and student learning outcomes
Teacher absence reduces the effective student-teacher ratio
(ESTR) for any given STR. To study the relationship between changes
in teacher absence between 2003 and 2010 and changes in student
learning outcomes in this period we first estimate:
DTS = b1D log(ESTR) + bzControls+ 4 (2)
where changes in village-level mean normalizedmath test scores are
regressed on changes in village-level ESTR. We find that reductions
26 This module was designed to complement the school surveys by allowing us to
create quantitative measures of district-level education governance. Unfortunately,
the non-completion rate for these interviews was very high (over 40%) due to non-
availability, and non-response of district-level administrators. Since this non-response
is clearly not random, we do not use the quantitative measures in regressions.
Nevertheless, important qualitative insights can be obtained from these interview
transcripts. These results are summarized in a companion policy report (Centre for
Policy Research, 2012).
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in ESTR are significantly correlatedwith increased student test scores
(Table 6 - columns 1 and 4).27
Reductions in ESTR can be achieved through reducing STR as well
as by reducing teacher absence. Rewriting Eq. (2), we have:
DTS = b1D log
(
STR
1 − Absence
)
+ bzControls+ 4 (3)
If we relax the constraint of equal coefficients on the numerator
and denominator in Eq. (3), we can rewrite it as:
DTS = b1D log(STR) − b2D log(1 − Absence) + bzControls+ 4 (4)
While not very precise, the estimates in Table 6 (column 5)
suggest that both reductions in log(STR), and reductions in log(1-
Absence)matter equally for improved test scores. Column 6 of Table 5
shows that once log(ESTR) is controlled for there is no independent
effect of teacher absence on learning outcomes, suggesting that the
main mechanism by which teacher absence affects learning out-
comes is through increasing the ESTR. The stronger relationship
between teacher absence and student learning outcomes seen in
columns 2 and 3 (that do not include state or district fixed effects)
suggests that teacher absence is likely correlated with other mea-
sures of education governance at the state and district levels, and
highlights why our preferred specifications are the ones with district
fixed effects.
Our data, which are collected seven years apart and have only
mean village-level test scores, are not ideal for studying the impact
of teacher absence or other school characteristics on test scores (the
ideal specifications would use annual panel data on student test
scores matched to these characteristics and estimate value-added
models of student learning). But it allows us to present suggestive
evidence on the negative correlations between teacher absence and
student learning outcomes that are consistent with other studies
using better data that find similar results.28 The results in Table 6
also help illustrate that teacher absence can attenuate the benefits
of reducing STR, and that reducing effective STR can be done both
by reducing STR and by reducing teacher absence. We consider the
relative cost effectiveness of these approaches in the next section.
5. The fiscal cost of weak governance
5.1. The fiscal cost of teacher absence
High levels of teacher absence translate into considerable waste
of public funds since teacher salaries are the largest component of
education spending in most countries, including India. One way of
estimating these costs is to calculate the total salary cost paid to
teachers for days of work that they were expected to attend, but do
not. Note that this is not a cost that would be saved if teacher absence
were to be reduced (since the full teacher salaries would be paid in
either case). However, it is standard in the corruption literature to
measure the cost of corruption by the amount of public expenditure
that does not reach its intended goal (often referred to as ‘leakage’),
and to measure the impact of interventions to reduce corruption by
quantifying the reduction in leakage, even if there is no reduction in
27 Regressions in Table 6 include controls for changes in all characteristics reported
in Table 4, but those coefficients are not shown since that is not the focus of our
analysis. Results are similar without the controls.
28 Duflo et al. (2012) show experimentally that lower teacher absence raises test
scores, whileMuralidharan (2012) shows this in value-added estimateswith five years
of annual panel data on test scores in the state of Andhra Pradesh matched with the
absence rate of the teacher of each student that year. Das et al. (2007) show that high
teacher absences in Zambia lead to significantly lower student test score gains. See
(Muralidharan, 2013) for a review of this evidence with a focus on India.
fiscal outlay (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004;Reinikka and Svensson,
2005;Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013;Muralidharan et al., 2016).29
We follow a similar approach here by first quantifying the salary
cost of absence as an estimate of ‘leakage’ in education spending,
and then using these costs as the metric to evaluate alternate policy
approaches to reducing ESTR.
Calculating the cost of teacher absence requires us to estimate
and exclude the extent of legitimate absence from our calculations.
As part of the institutional background work for this project, we
obtained teacher policy documents from several states across India.
Analysis of these documents indicates that the annual allowance for
personal and sick leave is 5% on average across states. This is close
to the survey estimate of 5.9%(Table 2), but we use the official data
since the stated reasons may be over-reported.
Estimating the extent of legitimate absence due to ‘official duty’
(outside the school) is more difficult because there are no standard
figures for the ‘expected’ level of teacher absence for official duties.
Policy norms prescribe minimal disruption to teachers during the
school day and stipulate that meetings and trainings be carried out
on non-school days or outside school hours. Since we are not able
to verify the claim that teachers were on official duty, and there is
evidence that head teachers try to cover up for teacher absences by
claiming that these are due to ‘official duties’, our default estimate
treats half of these cases as legitimate. This gives us a base case of
legitimate absence of 8% (5% authorized leave, and 3% official duty).
We also consider a more conservative case where the legitimate rate
of absence is 10%. This 8–10% range of legitimate absence also makes
sense because the fraction of teacher observations that are classified
as either ‘authorized leave’ or ‘official duty’ is in this range for the five
states with the lowest overall absence rates - even treating the stated
reasons for absence as being fully true (tables available on request).
To estimate the cost of teacher absence, we use teacher salary
data from our surveys and use administrative (DISE) data on the
number of primary school teachers by state.30 We provide three
estimates of the fiscal cost of teacher absence based on assuming
the rate of legitimate teacher absence to be 8, 9, and 10 percent%
respectively, and these calculations suggest that the annual fiscal
cost of teacher absence is around Rs.81 –93 billion, which is around
US$1.4–1.6 billion/year at 2010 exchange rates (Table 7 - Panel A).
5.2. Calculating the returns to better governance in education
Using the results in Table 4, we calculate the returns to amarginal
increase in the probability of a school being inspected. We make
the following assumptions: (a) enough supervisory staff are hired
to increase the probability of a school being inspected in the past
3 months by 10 percentage points (relative to a current probability
of 56%); (b) increasing inspection probability by 10 percentage points
29 Note that teacher absence per se does not entail an economic cost because it is
simply a transfer of resources from the tax payer to absent teachers (just like leakage
is a transfer from taxpayers to corrupt officials). Thus, the economic cost of teacher
absence is the long-term cost of poor service delivery (such as lower long-term human
capital and earnings). In practice, it is difficult to quantify these costs. Further, since
voters and tax-payers place intrinsic value on not wasting their money, there is con-
siderable policy interest in reducing leakage. This is why the corruption literature has
typically focused on estimating ‘leakage’ both to quantify corruption, and to use as a
metric to study the impacts of interventions to reduce it.
30 Detailed state-level figures on the number of teachers and their average salaries
are presented in Table A7. We augment the salary figures by 10% to reflect govern-
ment contributions to pensions. This is a conservative estimate since most of the older
cohorts of teachers are covered by amore expensive defined benefits pension plan. No
adjustment is made for medical benefits. We use the total number of primary school
teachers by state because the DISE data provides only the total number of teachers
by state, and not the urban-rural breakdown. Moreover, Kremer et al. (2005) report
very similar teacher absence rates across urban and rural schools (24.8% versus 26.3%)
and so we use the 2010 state-level teacher absence rates for our calculations, with the
caveat that these are for rural areas.
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Table 6
Panel OLS regression results, village-level (dependent variable: change in normalized math score).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Multiple regressions Multiple regressions
No fixed effects District fixed effects
Change in Log ESTR −0.199*** −0.097 −0.147** −0.142*
(0.069) (0.083) (0.071) (0.082)
Change in log STR −0.100 −0.149*
(0.083) (0.083)
Change in log (1-absence) 0.369*** 0.127
(0.106) (0.115)
Change in absence rate −0.005** −0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
F-statistic and p-value: 4.35 0.03
dlogSTR = -dlog(1-Absence) (0.0381) (0.8707)
R-squared 0.053 0.058 0.060 0.432 0.433 0.432
Number of villages 1149 1150 1149 1149 1150 1149
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are in parenthesis. All regressions are weighted by SCR population. Regressions include
the full set of controls as Table 3, coefficients not shown for brevity. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
Table 7
The fiscal cost of absence (year 2010).
(1)
Panel A: Fiscal cost of absence
Average monthly salary (Rs). 11,368
Number of teachers 3,949,338
Total loss due to absence (Rs. millions)
Allowed absence (8%) 92,699
Allowed absence (9%) 86,773
Allowed absence (10%) 80,847
Panel B: Marginal returns to investing in governance
Student teacher ratio (STR) 31.7
Effective student teacher ratio (ESTR) 41.5
Effect of increase inspection probability by 10 percentage points
Annual cost (Rs. millions) 448.0
Annual savings from reduced teacher absence (Rs. millions) 4509.6
Expected effective student teacher ratio 41.1
Cost to produce equal effect through teacher hiring 5742.0
Source: Authors’ calculations; DISE. Notes: All figures are in 2010 prices. Teacher
salaries data are from Teacher Long and School Census Data. Data on number of teach-
ers, number of schools, and enrollment are from DISE State Report Cards. Simulation
assumes that one inspection every 3 months reduces absence linearly by 6.4 percent-
age points. Inspector costs are assumed to be two times teacher salaries, travel costs
are assumed to be 80% of monthly salary, and an inspector is assumed to work 200
days a year and inspect two schools every day. Detailed calculations are available in
appendix tables A9 and A10.
would reducemean teacher absence across the schools in a village by
0.64 percentage points (the most conservative estimate of the corre-
lation between increased inspection probability and reduced teacher
absence from Table 4); (c) the full cost (salary and travel) of a super-
visor is 2.8 times that of a teacher; (d) a supervisor works 200 days
per year and can cover 2 schools per day.31
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 7 (Panel B)
and we see that the cost of hiring enough supervisors to increase the
probability of a school being inspected by 10 percentage points is
31 We use DISE data on the number of schools in each state to calculate the num-
ber of supervisors who will be required to increase the probability of inspections in
a 3-month interval by 10 percentage points. The cost estimates are conservative and
assume that the salary costs are double that of a teacher and that the travel costs are
equal to 80% of a full months’ salary (which is higher than the typical travel and daily
allowance provided to education department employees to travel to/from a village to
district headquarters).
Rs.448 million/year (see Table A8 for state-level calculations). How-
ever, the reduction in wasted salary from this investment in terms of
reduced teacher absence amounts to Rs.4.5 billion/year, suggesting
that investing in bettermonitoringwould lead to a reduction in ‘leak-
age’ of teacher salaries (defined as salary payments for days when
teachers do not attend work) that is around ten times greater than
the cost of increasing monitoring by hiring more supervisory staff.
5.3. Input augmentation versus inefficiency reduction
To compare the relative cost effectiveness of hiring more teach-
ers (input augmentation) versus hiring more supervisors to reduce
teacher absence (inefficiency reduction) as a way of reducing the
ESTR, we calculate the salary cost of hiring more teachers to achieve
the same reduction in ESTR that we estimate would be obtained by
increasing the inspection probability by 10 percentage points. We
estimate this to be Rs. 5.7 billion/year (Table 7 - Panel B; Table A8
provides detailed state-level calculations), and see that increasing
the probability of inspection would be 12.8 times more cost effec-
tive at reducing ESTR than doing so by hiring more teachers (on the
current margin).32
The difference in the relative cost effectiveness of the two pol-
icy options is large enough that hiring more supervisors rather than
teachers is likely to be a more cost effective way of reducing ESTR
(on the current margin) even if the supervisors were to work less
efficiently than assumed in these calculations. For instance, if super-
visors were absent at the same rate as teachers (say 25 %), allocating
marginal funds to hire an additional supervisor would still be nearly
ten timesmore cost effective at reducing ESTR than using those funds
to hire an additional teacher.33
32 Note that the estimated cost of achieving a given ESTR reduction through hir-
ing more teachers is higher than the cost of achieving a proportional STR reduction,
because our estimates suggest that reducing STR will increase the absence rates of the
existing teachers (we use the most conservative estimate from Table 4 for this calcu-
lation). In other words, this figure accounts for the fact that we estimate that reducing
STR is correlated with increased teacher absence rates, suggesting that increased
spending on hiring teachers is correlated with an increase in inefficiency as seen from
the discussion in Section 4.2.1.
33 Note that the economic benefit to reducing teacher absence may also include a
reduction in student absence. However, if we assume that any reduction in student
absence in response to a lower ESTR will be the same regardless of the specific policy
by which the reduction in ESTR is brought about, then our assessment of the relative
cost effectiveness of different policies to reduce ESTR will not be affected.
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6. Policy implications
The main caveat to using our results to recommend a universal
policy of hiring more supervisors to scale up the frequency of school
inspections is that our estimates are based on correlations and may
not be convincing enough to warrant a universal scale up. Never-
theless, it is worth noting that both our key results - the correlation
between increased monitoring and reduced teacher absence, and
the correlation between lower STR and increased teacher absence -
are consistentwith experimental evidence from smaller-scale, which
increases our confidence in their validity. Further, our estimates are
based on an expansion of existing system of inspections, and use
nationwide panel data (which mitigates omitted variables concerns)
representing close to a billion people, and complement results from
smaller-scale randomized experiments warranting them greater
external validity for several reasons.
First, while our results support results from smaller randomized
experiments, there is evidence that experimentally-estimated posi-
tive results of interventions that are implemented by NGOs may not
be replicated when the programs are implemented by governments
(Banerjee et al., 2008). Second, there is also evidence of site-selection
bias where implementing partners are more likely to be willing to
rigorously evaluate programs in locations where they are more likely
to be successful (Allcott, 2015). Finally, even in the absence of such
a bias, most experiments are conducted in very few sites, and may
yield imprecise treatment effects (for inference over a larger pop-
ulation) in a setting where unobserved site-specific covariates may
interact with the treatment (Pritchett and Sandefur, 2013).34
Thus, even if small-scale experiments are unbiased within sam-
ple, they may be biased and also imprecise for population-level
inference. In other words, there is likely to be a trade-off between
the potential omitted variable bias in our panel-data estimates on
one hand, and the advantages of greater precision, “as is” implemen-
tation, and unbiased site selection on the other. We do not attempt
to quantify this trade-off in this paper since we have no objective
basis of doing so. However, one way of reconciling this trade-off is
to conduct a substantial nationwide expansion of school inspections
by hiring more staff in the context of a large experimental evalu-
ation. From a decision-theoretic perspective, our results are strong
enough to support such a policy even if there is only a 1% chance
that our estimates are causal. In Appendix B, we formally show that,
barring extreme priors, a policy-maker interested in lowering effec-
tive student-teacher ratio will find it cost-effective to invest in or
scale-up monitoring of teachers.
7. Conclusions
The central and state governments in India have considerably
increased spending on primary education over the past decade. We
contribute towards understanding the impact of these substantial
nationwide investments in primary education in India by construct-
ing a unique nationally-representative panel data set on education
quality in rural India. We find that there has been a substantial
improvement in several measures of school quality including infras-
tructure, student-teacher ratios, and monitoring. However, teacher
absence rates continue to be high, with 23.6% of teachers in public
schools across rural India being absent during unannounced visits to
schools.
34 The largest education experiments to date that we know of have been conducted
over five districts in one state of India (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2010, 2011,
2013).While these experiments feature random assignment in representative samples
of schools (in a state with over 80 million people), they still come from just one state,
compared to the estimates in this paper that use panel data from 190 districts across
19 states.
Using village-level panel data, we find two robust correlations
in the panel data that provide external validity in nationally-
representative data to results established in smaller-scale experi-
ments. First, reductions in student-teacher ratios are strongly cor-
related with increased teacher absence, suggesting that increased
spending on hiring additional teachers was accompanied by
increased inefficiency, which may limit the extent to which addi-
tional spending may improve outcomes. Second, increases in the
frequency of inspections are strongly correlated with lower teacher
absence, suggesting that of all the investments in improving school
quality, the one that was most effective in reducing teacher absence
was improved administrative monitoring of schools and teach-
ers. We calculate that the fiscal cost of teacher absence is over
$1.5 billion per year, and estimate that investing in improved gover-
nance by increasing the frequency of monitoring would be over ten
times more cost effective at increasing student-teacher contact time
than doing so by hiring additional teachers.
In interpreting our results, it may be useful to think of the per-
formance of the education system (measured by the level of teacher
absence) as comprising two components - ‘inputs’ into the produc-
tion of education that expand with income growth (such as school
infrastructure, class size, and teacher salaries), and the efficiency of
the use of these inputs (which would correspond to the TFP of educa-
tion production). Our results show that the Indian education system
has made significant progress on the former, but made less progress
on the latter. They also suggest that pivoting public expenditure
away from simply augmenting inputs towards policies that increase
the efficiency of inputs may considerably increase the productivity
of education spending, and thereby enable achievement of improved
human capital outcomes at any given level of per-capita income.
One promising way of reducing inefficiency is improving school
governance and achieving such a reallocation of resources would be
to expand the existing system of administrative monitoring of teach-
ers and schools by hiring more supervisory staff. Our calculations
indicate that such a marginal expansion could (on the current mar-
gin) have a significant impact on reducing teacher absence, and that
this would be highly cost effective in terms of reducing the fiscal
cost of weak governance. More broadly, our results suggest that the
returns to investing in state capacity to better monitor the imple-
mentation of social programs in low-income countries may be quite
high, and that at the very least there is a strong case for expand-
ing such programs in the context of large experimental evaluations
of “as is” implementation to obtain more precise estimates of their
benefits.35
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Appendix A. Sampling and construction of village-level
panel dataset
The original survey in 2003 covered the 19 largest states of India
by population (except Delhi). Within each state, 10 districts were
sampled using Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) and within
each district, 10 primary sampling units (PSUs, which could be vil-
lages or towns) were sampled by PPS, thereby yielding a nationally
representative sample of 1,900 PSUs across 190 districts (includ-
ing towns and villages). The exception is Uttar Pradesh where 11
districts were sampled and Uttaranchal where 9 districts were sam-
pled (since Uttaranchal had only 9 districts, and Uttar Pradesh is the
largest state in India). Additionally, to account for the considerable
geographic diversity within Indian states, the sample was stratified
by geographic socio-cultural region (SCRs), and the 10 districts in
each state were allocated to SCRs proportional to the population of
the SCRs. Similarly, the 10 PSUs within each district were allocated
to villages/towns proportional to the rural/urban population split in
the district. All sampling was done on the basis of the 1991 census,
since that was the latest Census data available at the time of the
study.
The 2003 sample was augmented to include 241 villages from
the REDS survey (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996). Since the REDS vil-
lages are drawn as a representative samplewithin districts, including
these villages does not change the representativeness of the sample.
If a REDS district was in our main sample, the REDS villages were
included (typically 2 to 4 per REDS district) and additional villages
were sampled randomly to make up the total desired sample size. If
a REDS district was not in our sample, those villages were covered in
addition to our core sample. Including these villages provides more
precise estimates of outcomes in the SCRs where they are located.
All analysis is weighted by SCR populations, so the final estimates
continue to be nationally-representative on a population weighted
basis.
The final sample in 2003 comprised of 2141 rural and urban
PSUs across 19 states of India. In 2010, since the survey only cov-
ered rural areas, the sample size was reduced from 10 to 8 villages
per district. All districts in the 2003 sample were retained in the
2010 study, with three exceptions where full-urban districts sam-
pled in 2003 were replaced with a new PPS sampled district from
the same SCR. The three replaced districts are Hyderabad in Andhra
Pradesh, Ahmedabad in Gujarat, and Greater Bombay in Maharash-
tra, which are highly urban districts containing their respective state
capitals.
As we highlight in the paper, to meet our objective to maintain
both representativeness of the current landscape of schools in rural
India and to maximize the size of the panel, we retain villages from
the 2003 study to the extent possible. In Column 1 of Table A1, we
provide state-wise counts of rural PSUs that were sampled in the
2003 study. After removing PSUs in the three replaced districts alto-
gether and all other urban PSUs from the 2003 study, the maximum
panel size we could draw, including the REDS villages was 1,668. We
sampled a 2003 village by default as long as the village had a popu-
lation between 250 and 10,000 as per the 1991 Census, and we could
locate the village in the 2001 Census.36 In districts where we had
more than 8 rural PSUs in 2003, we sampled 8 PSUs randomly. The
lower cutoff on population was based on the Government of India’s
mandate that all rural habitations exceeding 250 people should have
a school with 1 km. Since villages and hamlets can be absorbed into
expanding cities over time, we match the originally sampled 1991
village to the villages in the 2001 Census to make sure that the
sampled village still exists.
From the 2003 list of 1668 villages, we had to remove 249 from
the 2010 sampling frame for reasons we discuss below (see Columns
5 through 9 of Table A1 for the distribution of these villages across
states). 69 villages were dropped because they fall in districts that
had more than 8 villages in the 2003 round. A further 129 villages
were removed either because their populationwas below 250, or had
far exceeded 10,000 in the 2001 Census (20,000 for Kerala). A total of
36 villages could not be located in the 2001 Census (suggesting that
they had either been depopulated or absorbed into nearby towns).
Finally, 15 villages were replaced due to safety, logistical and acces-
sibility reasons. Thus, our sample consists of 1419 villages from 2003
(Table A1 - column 3).
In districts where we had fewer than 8 villages in the 2003 sam-
ple (recall that the rural/urban sampling within districts was done on
the basis of population ratios, and thus districts where over 25% of
the population in 1991 was urban would have fewer than 8 villages),
we sample more villages as required to reach a minimum sample
size of 8 villages per district for the 2010 survey. The new villages
were sampled PPS from the universe of eligible villages in the 2001
Census that were not already sampled. The cross-section sample
(including REDS villages) thus consists of 1,650 villages (Table A1 -
column 2).
Of the 1650 villages that comprise our 2010 sample, data from
1555 villages were included in the analysis presented in this paper
(Table A2 - column 2). First, we found that 29 of the 1650 villages
have no schools in the village. A large proportion of these villages
(12 out of 29) are in Himachal Pradesh, which is a sparsely populated
mountainous state, with many small habitations. Another 39 villages
did not have a public school within the village, but did have a private
school. Since this paper focuses on changes in public schools, these
villages are not included in the analysis. In Kerala, we lose another
12 villages, because all schools in the village refused to be allowed
to be surveyed.37 Finally, we drop 15 more villages from our anal-
ysis because in these villages, schools were either not functional or
closed in all three visits, which means we were unable to complete
surveys. A state-level breakdown of these 95 villages is provided
in Columns 4–7 of Table A2. The decline in the cross-section sam-
ple size for reasons we discussed above, also reduces the number
of villages for which we have panel data. After accounting for the
above 95 villages and 53 villages in 2003 for which we have no data
(for similar reasons as outlined for the 2010 survey round), our final
panel size is 1297 villages. These 1297 villages form the core of our
analysis.
36 The exception to this is Kerala, which has a much higher population density,
where the upper cut-off was 20,000.
37 Permission to survey was refused in spite of the survey team possessing the
required permission documents. Kerala has a history of strong unions and it was not
possible for the field teams to overcome this opposition.
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Table A1
Description of sample: Panel construction.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Number of villages Reasons for reduction in panel size
Year 2003 Year 2010 Panel Reduction in More than 8 panel Village population Village population Village not found Other reasons
panel size villages in district less than 250 more than 10,000 in Census 2001
Andhra Pradesh 81 87 73 8 3 0 4 1 0
Assam 98 87 77 21 5 3 0 10 3
Bihar 94 84 84 10 10 0 0 0 0
Chattisgarh 85 80 76 9 1 0 1 2 5
Gujarat 82 88 74 8 2 2 2 0 2
Haryana 81 81 75 6 3 1 1 1 0
Himachal Pradesh 89 80 60 29 2 22 0 4 1
Jharkhand 87 84 73 14 7 4 0 1 2
Karnataka 91 89 84 7 2 3 2 0 0
Kerala 83 83 43 40 0 0 40 0 0
Madhya Pradesh 88 90 81 7 3 1 2 1 0
Maharastra 85 91 80 5 2 0 3 0 0
Orissa 92 87 79 13 4 5 1 3 0
Punjab 78 82 75 3 0 0 1 2 0
Rajasthan 91 98 85 6 1 1 0 4 0
Tamilnadu 84 87 69 15 5 0 6 4 0
Uttar Pradesh 114 113 104 10 9 1 0 0 0
Uttaranchal 80 72 57 23 6 14 1 2 0
West Bengal 85 87 70 15 4 3 5 1 2
India 1,668 1,650 1,419 249 69 60 69 36 15
Source: Authors’ calculations.Notes: The upper population cutoff for all states was 10,000 as per the 1991 census, except Kerala where the cutoff was 20,000. The category others include: replaced because high Naxalite activity (6 villages),
replaced because duplicate in 2003 sample (2 villages), replaced because district was replaced (2 villages) replaced because village too remote (1 village), replaced because name missing in 2003 list (1 village), replaced because of floods
in village (2 village), replaced because village could not be located (1 village).
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Table A2
Description of sample: Data and attrition.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Year 2010 sample Reasons for attrition (Year 2010) Reasons for attrition (Year 2010) Reasons for attrition
Sampled Included in Attrition No school No public school School(s) refused Other reasons Sampled Included in Attrition No data for No data for
analysis in village in village to survey Analysis year 2010 year 2003
Andhra Pradesh 87 86 1 0 0 0 1 73 70 3 1 2
Assam 87 83 4 1 3 0 0 77 72 5 3 2
Bihar 84 81 3 1 1 0 1 84 77 7 3 4
Chattisgarh 80 75 5 2 1 0 2 76 69 7 4 3
Gujarat 88 85 3 0 3 0 0 74 71 3 3 0
Haryana 81 80 1 0 1 0 0 75 63 12 0 12
Himachal Pradesh 80 59 21 16 5 0 0 60 43 17 16 1
Jharkhand 84 81 3 2 1 0 0 73 58 15 3 12
Karnataka 89 88 1 0 1 0 0 84 82 2 1 1
Kerala 83 65 18 0 5 12 1 43 31 12 8 4
Madhya Pradesh 90 88 2 0 1 0 1 81 78 3 2 1
Maharastra 91 83 8 1 3 0 4 80 73 7 7 0
Orissa 87 83 4 2 1 0 1 79 73 6 3 3
Punjab 82 80 2 1 1 0 0 75 71 4 2 2
Rajasthan 98 94 4 1 2 0 1 85 83 2 2 0
Tamilnadu 87 79 8 1 5 0 2 69 62 7 5 2
Uttar Pradesh 113 111 2 0 2 0 0 104 100 4 2 2
Uttaranchal 72 67 5 1 3 0 1 57 52 5 4 1
West Bengal 87 87 0 0 0 0 0 70 69 1 0 1
India 1650 1555 95 29 39 12 15 1419 1297 122 69 53
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: The category others include: high Naxalite activity, village not reachable, schools not functional, and schools closed in all three visits. In 2003, if a village did not have any schools, surveyors went to
the neighboring village. In 2010, the village was simply recorded as having no school.
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Table A3
Description of sample: Final sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year 2010 sample Panel
Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of
villages schools teachers villages schools in 2003 schools 2010 in 2003 teachers in 2010
Andhra
Pradesh
86 130 509 70 107 107 372 405
Assam 83 150 525 72 122 134 437 473
Bihar 81 124 757 77 112 119 341 731
Chattisgarh 75 100 450 69 94 92 259 412
Gujarat 85 119 944 71 101 98 419 798
Haryana 80 105 520 63 85 83 386 395
Himachal
Pradesh
59 70 270 43 44 51 172 205
Jharkhand 81 132 493 58 76 94 244 374
Karnataka 88 120 572 82 117 112 598 530
Kerala 65 105 608 31 57 50 353 307
Madhya
Pradesh
88 146 476 78 116 133 367 427
Maharastra 83 98 495 73 96 88 441 451
Orissa 83 114 483 73 88 101 295 439
Punjab 80 88 469 71 75 76 355 417
Rajasthan 94 141 671 83 132 121 497 565
Tamilnadu 79 96 445 62 124 75 455 363
Uttar
Pradesh
111 135 616 100 131 119 442 542
Uttaranchal 67 73 207 52 61 57 177 151
West
Bengal
87 151 668 69 108 121 331 531
India 1555 2197 10,178 1297 1846 1831 6941 8516
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table A4
Absence rate of teachers & student-teacher ratios in rural public schools by state by year.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Absence rates(%) Student- teacher ratio Effective student-teacher ratio
Year 2003 Year 2010 Change Year 2003 Year 2010 Change Year 2003 Year 2010 Change†
Andhra
Pradesh
23.38 21.48 −1.90 27.51 25.79 −1.71 35.90 32.85 −3.05
Assam 36.15 26.26 −9.89*** 28.21 36.07 7.86*** 44.18 48.92 4.74
Bihar 39.42 28.69 −10.73*** 72.44 69.01 −3.43 119.57 96.78 −22.79
Chattisgarh 30.47 14.20 −16.28*** 42.12 33.05 −9.07*** 60.59 38.52 −22.07
Gujarat 17.92 16.14 −1.77* 40.42 31.94 −8.48*** 49.24 38.09 −11.15
Haryana 21.07 17.75 −3.31** 34.40 36.34 1.94 43.58 44.18 0.60
Himachal
Pradesh
22.67 30.74 8.07*** 18.04 21.73 3.69** 23.33 31.38 8.04
Jharkhand 43.50 45.84 2.34 52.30 42.84 −9.47*** 92.57 79.09 −13.48
Karnataka 22.60 23.93 1.33 29.07 23.62 −5.45*** 37.56 31.05 −6.51
Kerala 19.60 15.79 −3.81*** 24.84 24.49 −0.36 30.90 29.08 −1.82
Madhya
Pradesh
18.19 26.34 8.16*** 37.19 46.57 9.39*** 45.45 63.23 17.78
Maharastra 15.43 14.12 −1.31 34.54 28.66 −5.88*** 40.84 33.38 −7.47
Orissa 21.69 14.24 −7.46*** 47.01 36.63 −10.38*** 60.04 42.72 −17.32
Punjab 36.66 13.54 −23.13*** 30.80 31.43 0.63 48.63 36.36 −12.28
Rajasthan 25.13 22.72 −2.42* 38.91 32.05 −6.86*** 51.97 41.47 −10.50
Tamilnadu 20.43 12.92 −7.51*** 29.56 25.85 −3.71** 37.15 29.69 −7.47
Uttar
Pradesh
26.72 31.21 4.49*** 69.37 47.40 −21.97*** 94.66 68.90 −25.76
Uttaranchal 32.29 21.02 −11.27*** 24.49 31.02 6.54** 36.17 39.28 3.12
West
Bengal
26.41 20.97 −5.44*** 58.23 41.61 −16.62*** 79.12 52.65 −26.47
India 26.29 23.64 −2.64*** 47.19 39.80 −7.39*** 64.02 52.13 −11.89
Source: Authors’ calculations; DISE Notes: All figures are weighted by SCR’s rural population. Absence figures for 2003 differ from the figures in the Kremer et al. (2005) paper. This
is because the urban schools are removed from the sample. We do not conduct inference on the changes in “Effective student-teacher ratio” because the data on total number of
teachers are obtained from administrative (DISE) data.
†We do not conduct inference on the changes in “Effective student-teacher ratio” because the data on total number of teachers are obtained from administrative (DISE) data. ***
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table A5
Panel OLS regression results, village-level(dependent variable: Change in probability of inspection in past 3months).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual regressions Multiple regressions
No fixed w/state w/district No fixed w/state w/district
effects fixed effects fixed effects effects fixed effects fixed effects
Changes in teacher variables
Have bachelors degree −0.003 0.042 0.039 0.006 0.037 0.030
(0.046) (0.053) (0.050) (0.046) (0.051) (0.055)
Have teacher training 0.041 0.054 0.085 0.029 0.046 0.064
(0.056) (0.057) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.061)
Are contract teachers 0.055 0.063 −0.040 0.108* 0.088 −0.009
(0.053) (0.073) (0.069) (0.059) (0.070) (0.082)
Are paid regularly −0.036 −0.010 −0.010 −0.037 −0.005 −0.004
(0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.035) (0.041)
Recognition scheme exists 0.069** 0.062** 0.020 0.067** 0.060* 0.023
(0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.037)
Changes in school variables
Log student-teacher ratio 0.055* 0.032 0.029 0.049 0.024 0.012
(0.031) (0.032) (0.034) (0.030) (0.031) (0.037)
Mid-day meals 0.007 −0.008 −0.024 0.018 −0.008 −0.017
(0.032) (0.041) (0.046) (0.034) (0.042) (0.050)
Infrastructure index (0-4) 0.010 0.011 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.004
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Remoteness index (normalized) −0.023 −0.026 −0.032 −0.024 −0.024 -0.028
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
Changes in monitoring and community variables
Probability of PTAmeeting in last 3 months 0.018 0.052** 0.068** 0.033 0.053** 0.070**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027)
Mean parental education (1–7 scale) −0.03 −0.04 −0.04** −0.04 −0.04* −0.05**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025)
Log state per-capita GDP −4.69 0.40**
(7.392) (0.167)
Regression statistics
Constant −0.13
(0.138)
R-squared 0.051 0.093 0.315
Adjusted R-squared 0.034 0.065 0.152
Number of villages 1300 1300 1300
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parentheses. Infrastructure index variable uses availability of four items (drinking
water, toilets, electricity, and library) with higher values representing better infrastructure; similarly remoteness index uses distances to nine sets of facilities, with higher values
representing more remote villages. Regressions are weighted by SCR’s population. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table A6
Selection on observables and selection on unobservables (An application of Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005)).
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Percentage change in absence
Treatment variable: Increase in inspection probability
Coefficient on treatment Unconstrained coefficient Estimate of bias Implied ratio [(1)/(2)]
Base specification (no fixed effects) −5.560*** −2.298 2.598
(1.551)
State fixed effects −5.343*** −0.856 6.176
(1.499)
District fixed effects −5.118*** −0.502 10.189
(1.765)
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. Regressions include full set of controls as Table 3, coefficients not
shown for brevity. We discretize the main variable of interest - Change in probability of inspection. Villages where inspection rates increased between 2003 and 2010 are coded
as 1, and 0 otherwise. 52% of villages experienced an increase in inspection, and inspection rates fell or did not change in the remaining 48%. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at
5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table A7
The fiscal cost of absence (year 2010).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average monthly Number of Total loss due to absence (millions of Rs.)
teacher salary (Rs.) teachers Allowed absence: Allowed absence: Allowed absence:
8% 9% 10%
Andhra Pradesh 10,299 347,875 6374 5901 5428
Assam 9567 167,161 3855 3644 3433
Bihar 8645 336,359 7942 7559 7175
Chattisgarh 8290 155,573 1055 885 715
Gujarat 15,804 198,584 3374 2960 2546
Haryana 16,236 77,980 1630 1463 1296
Himachal Pradesh 12,199 48,507 1776 1698 1620
Jharkhand 9734 135,690 6598 6423 6249
Karnataka 10,897 195,929 4489 4207 3925
Kerala 10,751 54,976 608 529 451
Madhya Pradesh 9294 267,846 6027 5698 5370
Maharastra 17,246 288,914 4025 3367 2710
Orissa 9382 192,119 1484 1246 1008
Punjab 12,654 105,930 980 803 626
Rajasthan 14,165 271,205 7463 6956 6448
Tamilnadu 18,489 150,820 1811 1443 1075
Uttar Pradesh 10,370 491,455 15,615 14,942 14,269
Uttaranchal 17,155 45,782 1350 1246 1143
West Bengal 10,555 416,633 7527 6946 6366
India 11,368 3,949,338 92,699 86,773 80,847
Source: Authors’ calculations; DISE. Notes: 2010 teacher salaries are from Teacher Long and School Census Data. Data on total number of teachers are from DISE State Report Cards.
All figures are in 2010 prices.
Table A8
Marginal returns to investing in governance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Student-teacher ratio (2009–2010) Effect of increasing probability of inspection in past 3
months by 10 percentage points
Cost to produce equal effect
through teacher hiring
Student-teacher ratio Effective student-teacher ratio Annual cost
(Rs. millions)
Annual savings from reduced
teacher absence (Rs. millions)
Expected effective
student-teacher ratio
Annual cost (Rs. millions)
Andhra Pradesh 17.8 22.7 31.0 350.8 22.5 433.5
Assam 24.5 33.2 15.9 154.5 33.0 204.2
Bihar 58.2 81.6 21.2 273.6 80.8 374.9
Chattisgarh 24.5 28.5 13.9 120.1 28.3 135.0
Gujarat 29.8 35.5 19.1 291.8 35.3 336.2
Haryana 26.8 32.5 8.8 118.9 32.3 139.8
Himachal Pradesh 15.4 22.2 6.8 56.0 22.0 79.2
Jharkhand 41.3 76.2 14.8 127.9 75.3 236.3
Karnataka 23.6 31.0 18.5 201.6 30.8 257.7
Kerala 19.6 23.2 2.0 56.3 23.1 64.5
Madhya Pradesh 39.8 54.0 40.6 250.9 53.5 332.1
Maharastra 25.7 29.9 45.0 486.8 29.7 546.8
Orissa 29.4 34.3 20.5 177.5 34.1 199.7
Punjab 20.5 23.7 10.2 137.4 23.5 153.2
Rajasthan 26.2 33.9 40.0 361.6 33.6 454.5
Tamilnadu 28.3 32.5 24.6 264.9 32.3 293.2
Uttar Pradesh 40.1 58.2 58.4 489.4 57.7 697.1
Uttaranchal 20.6 26.0 10.7 73.3 25.8 90.0
West Bengal 32.3 40.8 30.1 409.4 40.5 502.5
India 31.7 41.5 448.0 4509.6 41.1 5742.0
Source: Authors’ calculations; DISE. Notes: Number of schools, number of teachers, and enrollment figures are from administrative (DISE) data. Simulation assumes that one
inspection every 3 months reduces absence linearly by 6.4 percentage points. Inspector costs are assumed to be two times teacher salaries, travel costs are assumed to be 80% of
monthly salary, and an inspector is assumed to work 200 days a year and inspect two schools every day.
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To ensure a representative sample of schools, enumerators first
conducted a full mapping of all public and private schools in each
sampled village. Enumerators conducted “Participatory Resource
Assessments” with households at multiple locations (at least three)
within each village to obtain a list of all primary schools within the
boundary of the village. All enumerated schools were administered a
short survey that included questions on school administration such
as management (public or private), enrollment, infrastructure etc.
Enumerators also collected a list of all teachers in the school and
their demographic characteristics. This school listing in each sam-
pled village provided the frame for school sampling. We sampled up
to three schools per village. If the village had three or fewer schools,
all schools were sampled. If the village had more than three schools,
we stratified the schools by management type and randomly sam-
pled two public schools and one private school to the extent possible.
In the event that there were only one public school and two or more
private schools, one government and two private schools were sam-
pled. Table A3 provides the state-level breakdown of the number of
schools and teachers in the final (public school) sample used in this
paper (both cross section and panel).
Appendix B. A decision-theoretic case for scale-ups of
monitoring with an RCT
Formally, consider a simple binary policy regarding the num-
ber of supervisors to be hired that can take the values {0, 1}, where
the current policy is {0} and {1} represents a ‘new’ policy of hiring
enough supervisors to ensure that all schools are inspected once in
three months. The costs of the new policy are the additional salary
and operational costs of hiring supervisors, and the benefits are the
reduced fiscal cost of teacher absence. Denote these by C{1} and B{1}
respectively, and assume that it is optimal to implement the policy
if B{1} > C{1}. However, while C{1} is known, there is uncertainty
around B{1} and a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in the context of
a policymovement towards {1}would reduce the uncertainty around
B{1}.
Suppose that after the trial, the likelihood that the optimal policy
switches from {0} to {1} is p and that the expected per-period net
benefit of such a switch is q. Let cost of data collection and analysis
of a trial be C{data} and the discount rate be r. Let the period of the
trial be one year and the fraction of the population participating in
the trial be N. Half of those in the trial are allocated to a treatment
group and the other half to a control group. Since data collection will
be based on a representative sample of trial sites, we assume that
C{data} does not vary with the size of the trial. The one period cost of
the trial is then C{data}+(N/2)∗C{1}. The benefits of the trial are the
expected one-period benefit of the new policy (during the trial) and
the discounted benefits of switching to a new policy (in perpetuity),
weighted by the probability that the trial will lead to a switch in the
policy. Thus, the trial should be conducted as long as:
C{data} + (N/2) ∗ C{1} < (N/2) ∗ B{1} + pq
r
∗ 1
1+ r
(B.1)
To focus on the benefits of learning if the optimal policy should
be {1} instead of {0}, we abstract away from the benefit of the policy
during the trial period and the one-period delay in implementing the
new policy (if found to be optimal), in which case the trial should be
conducted as long as:
C{data} + (N/2) ∗ C{1} < pq
r
(B.2)
Using our results to calibrate these quantities, it is straightfor-
ward to see that the expected benefits of a trial are very large
even under extremely conservative assumptions. The estimates in
Table A8 suggest that the marginal cost of {1} would be $33 million
and that themarginal benefit would be $331million (using our panel
data estimates).38 Thus, if our estimates are true, q would be around
$300 million/year, and using a discount rate of 10%, the net present
value of moving to {1} would be $3 billion. Now suppose there is
only a 1% chance that the causal impacts of inspections on teacher
absence are as great as the panel data estimates presented here and
that there is a 99% chance that the causal impacts of inspection are
not significantly different from zero (i.e. p = 0.01). Even then, we
see that
[
q
(1+r) ∗ pq
]
is $30 million.
On the cost side, we conservatively estimate (using data from
our own field costs) that a highly-powered trial would have C{data}
in the range of $1 million. A trial with an N of 0.06 would be a
very large trial and could cover a nationally-representative sample
across all major Indian states, but would only cost $1 million/year.39
Thus, even including all costs of data collection, the upper bound
of the costs of such a trial would be $2 million compared to a
likely lower-bound expected benefit of $30 million.40 An expansion
of school inspections in the context of an experimental evaluation
would therefore make sense even if there was only a 1% chance of
the true effects being the same as our panel-data estimates.
If we use amedical ethics perspective in this setting, we also need
to consider the costs of not providing a treatment that is known (or
highly likely) to be effective. In this case, that would be the foregone
one-period benefit of scaling up the treatment immediately (which
we estimate to be around $300 million). Thus, depending on their
prior beliefs, and the extent to which our panel data estimates shift
these priors, some policy makers may choose to switch the policy
regime from {0} to {1} immediately. However, the point of our exer-
cise above is to show that policy makers, depending on their beliefs,
should either implement {1} immediately or do a large expansion in
the context of an RCT as described above, but it would only be under
an extreme set of beliefs (that there is less than a 1% chance of our
panel-data estimates being truly causal) that a policy maker would
do nothing based on our results.
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